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Why the Federal Marriage Amendment
is Not Only Not Necessary, But a
Bad Idea: A Response to
Christopher Wolfe

MICHAEL PERRY*

As of March 22, 2004, the text of the proposed Federal Marriage
Amendment (FMA) states:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a
woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be
construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred
upon any union other than the union of a man and a woman.1

Assume that, like Christopher Wolfe, we are morally opposed to
granting the legal status of marriage to any couple other than a man
and a woman.2 Presumably, then, we would oppose a legislative
effort to grant such status to same-sex couples. Troubled by some
recent, high-profile judicial decisions, we might also want to amend
the Constitution of the United States to prevent any court, federal or

* Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law, Emory University; Senior Fellow, Law
and Religion Program, Emory University.
1. S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2005). An earlier draft of the FMA stated:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a
woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, nor State
or Federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal
incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.
http://usgovinfo.about.com/cs/usconstitution/a/marriage.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2005).
2. See Christopher Wolfe, Why the Federal Marriage Amendment is Necessary,
42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 895 (2005).
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state, from ruling that the Constitution requires states to grant such
status to same-sex couples. The proposed FMA would do this.
However, it would do more—and it is that “more” that concerns me
here: The proposed FMA would also prevent any state court from ruling
that the state constitution requires the state to grant marital status (that is,
the legal status of marriage) to same-sex couples. Why should we want
to amend the U.S. Constitution to do that? Assume that a generation
from now the people of California, in part inspired by the Constitution of
South Africa, would like to amend their constitution to forbid
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; in particular, they
would like to entrench in their constitution a rule granting the marital
status to same-sex couples. Why should we want the U.S. Constitution
to prevent the people of California from doing that?
The proposed FMA would do still more: It would prevent the
legislature of any state from choosing to grant marital status to same-sex
couples. Why should we want the U.S. Constitution to prevent the
California legislature, say, from doing that? 3
I can understand why we would want the U.S. Constitution to prevent
California and every other state from enacting/enforcing laws or
pursuing policies that would violate the human rights of its citizens or
any other persons subject to its jurisdiction—laws/policies that would
treat persons as if they lacked the “inherent dignity” that, according to
the morality of human rights, each and every human being has.4 I can
3. Notice that the present text of proposed FMA, unlike the earlier text, supra
note 1, does not forbid state legislatures to grant the status of “civil union” to same-sex
couples. If I understand his argument, Wolfe prefers the earlier text, according to which
no state may choose to grant civil union status to same-sex couples.
4. See Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Human Rights: A Nonreligious Ground?,
54 EMORY L.J. 97 (2005).
We who affirm the morality of human rights, because we affirm it, should do (we have
good reason to do) what we can, all things considered, to prevent government from
violating human beings. That is, we should do what we reasonably can to prevent
government from taking actions or pursuing policies that deny that one or more human
beings have, or treat them as if they lack, inherent dignity. One of the things that we in
liberal democracies can do, that we are politically free to do, to prevent governments—our
own government as well as other governments—from violating human beings is support
laws that forbid, or if enacted would forbid, governments to take actions or pursue policies
that violate one or more human beings.
When I say that a government action/policy violates a human being, I mean that the
rationale for the action/policy violates a human being; that is, the rationale either denies
that one or more human beings have inherent dignity or treats them as if they lack it.
What the Nazis did to Jews was embedded in an ideology according to which Jews are
pseudohuman; the Nazis denied that Jews have whatever moral status—whatever
dignity, whatever worth—true human beings have. (According to the morality of human
rights, the moral status that human beings have is inherent dignity.) Whether or not
Bosnian Serbs believed that Bosnian Muslims were pseudohuman, Bosnian Serbs
certainly treated Bosnian Muslims as if they lacked inherent dignity. How else to understand
what Bosnian Serbs did to Bosnian Muslims—humiliation, rape, torture, murder? In that
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also understand why we would want the U.S. Constitution to prevent
California and every other state from unjustifiably tolerating private
actions that violate human rights—that treat persons as if they lack
“inherent dignity.” So, we are happy that the Constitution bans slavery.
If one believes, as Professor Wolfe and many others do, that abortion
violates the human rights of unborn children,5 one may want to push for
a constitutional amendment banning abortion.6 However, granting civil
union status or even marital status to same-sex couples does not violate
anyone’s human rights, it does not treat anyone as if he or she lacks
“inherent dignity.” Some argue that refusing to grant such status to
same-sex couples violates the human rights of those couples, but to
reject that claim—as, of course, those who are morally opposed to
sense, what Bosnian Serbs did to Bosnian Muslims constituted a practical denial—an
existential denial—that Bosnian Muslims have inherent dignity.
It would be a mistake, however, to think that we who affirm the morality of human
rights should want the law to ban only actions/policies that violate (that is, whose
rationales violate) one or more human beings. We should also want the law to ban
actions/policies that, even if they (their rationales) do not violate any human being—even if
they neither deny that any human being has inherent dignity nor treat any human being
as if she lacks it—are nonetheless a source of unwarranted human suffering or other
harm. I am referring here to significant human suffering (or other harm), not trivial human
suffering. If we decline to do what we can, all things considered, to diminish unwarranted
human suffering (or other harm)—and by “we” I mean here primarily the collective we,
as in “We the People,” acting though our elected representatives—we decline to do what
we can, all things considered, to protect those who endure that suffering. We thereby fail
to respect their inherent dignity; we violate them by treating them as if they lack inherent
dignity. Martin Luther King Jr. said, “Man’s inhumanity to man is not only perpetrated
by the vitriolic actions of those who are bad. It is also perpetrated by the vitiating
inaction of those who are good.” Nicholas D. Kristof, The American Witness, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at A19 (quoting Martin Luther King, Jr.). Sometimes it is not, or
not only, a government action/policy that violates human beings; sometimes the violation
consists in our failure to do what we can, all things considered, to protect human beings
from the action/policy.
To say, in the present context, that an instance of human suffering is “unwarranted” is
to say that the action/policy that is a source of the suffering—that is a cause of the
suffering or that fails to intervene to diminish the suffering—is not warranted, that it is
not justified. Not justified from whose perspective? It is scarcely surprising that the
action/policy, and therefore the suffering that it causes, or fails to intervene to diminish,
is justified from the perspective of those whose action/policy is in question. But theirs is
not the relevant perspective. The relevant perspective belongs to those of us who, in
coming face to face with the suffering, must decide what, if anything, to do, or to try to
do, about it; in making that decision, we must reach our own judgment about whether the
suffering is warranted.
5. Wolfe, supra note 2, at 907–08.
6. But see M. Cathleen Kaveny, Toward a Thomistic Perspective on Abortion and
the Law in Contemporary America, 55 THE THOMIST 343, 393–94 (1991).
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granting such status to same-sex couples do—is not to deny that
choosing to grant such status to same-sex couples does not violate
anyone’s human rights.
Why, then, does Professor Wolfe want to entrench in the U.S.
Constitution a rule that would prevent the people of each and every state,
acting through their elected representatives, from granting marital status
to same-sex couples? This is the heart of Wolfe’s argument:
[G]ender complementarity is . . . essential to the maintenance of marriage as the
fundamental social institution on which society rests.
. . . The most principled and fundamental case against gay marriage is not
that “it should not be permitted” (as if it were genuinely an optional matter) but
rather that “it is impossible”—that any purported gay marriage lacks essential
and necessary qualities of real marriage (irrespective of what the law says)—just
as a bigamous marriage or a marriage between a man and an animal would be
impossible.7

Whether, according to Wolfe’s understanding of marriage, a same-sex
“marriage” is, as he claims, “impossible,” it is certainly possible for a state
legislature to grant marital status to same-sex couples—though Wolfe,
like most other Americans, opposes its doing so. As I said, I can understand
why, if we are morally opposed to granting marital status to same-sex
couples, we would oppose a legislative effort to do so. The issue before
us now is different, however: Assuming that we are morally opposed to
granting marital status to same-sex couples, why should we want the
U.S. Constitution to prevent the citizens of a state, acting through their
legislators, from choosing to grant marital status to same-sex couples?
Our moral opposition to granting marital status to same-sex couples
easily explains our opposition to legislative efforts to do so. Further, if
we thought that granting marital status to same-sex couples violated
human rights, our moral opposition to granting marital status to
same-sex couples would also explain our appetite for a constitutional
amendment preventing any state from granting marital status to same-sex
couples. To enslave someone or to permit the enslavement of
someone—or, arguably, to abort someone or to permit the aborting of
someone—is to violate someone’s human rights. However, to grant
marital status to same-sex couples is not to violate anyone’s human
rights; it is not to treat anyone as if he or she lacks inherent dignity.
Therefore, even if we are morally opposed to granting marital status to
same-sex couples, why should we want the U.S. Constitution to prevent
each and every state legislature from granting marital status to same-sex
couples? This is the question-in-chief—a question that is all the more
7. Wolfe, supra note 2, at 909–10. I wonder whether Wolfe believes polygamous
marriages to be impossible too?
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urgent when we realize that Wolfe’s principal claim, about “gender
complementarity,” is greatly controversial, even among Wolfe’s own
co-religionists. There are many examples of Roman Catholic theologians
and philosophers who reject the gender-complementarity claim.8
Why is the gender-complementarity claim so controversial? Catholic
theologian Rosemary Ruether has explained that for anyone who rejects
the Catholic Church’s official teaching (the teaching of the magisterium
of the Church) on sex and procreation—the teaching that it is immoral
for anyone, male or female, to choose (a) to engage in any species of sex
(coital) act that of its nature cannot be procreative (for example, oral
sex) or (b) to prevent any particular sex act from being procreative (for
example, by using a contraceptive device):
it is no longer possible to argue that sex/love between two persons of the same
sex cannot be a valid embrace of bodily selves expressing love. If sex/love is
centered primarily on communion between two selves rather than on biologistic
8. See Stephen J. Pope, The Magisterium’s Arguments against Same-Sex Marriage:
An Ethical Analysis and Critique, 65 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 530 (2004). Pope is a
Catholic theologian at Boston College, a Jesuit university; THEOLOGICAL STUDIES is
published by Jesuits in the United States. There are many other examples. See, e.g.,
Jack A. Bonsor, Homosexual Orientation and Anthropology: Reflections on the Category
“Objective Disorder”, 59 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 60 (1998) (Bonsor teaches theology at
Santa Clara University, a Jesuit institution); Margaret A. Farley, An Ethic for Same-Sex
Relations, in A CHALLENGE TO LOVE: GAY AND LESBIAN CATHOLICS IN THE CHURCH
(Robert Nugent ed., 1983) (Farley, a member of the Sisters of Mercy, is the Gilbert L.
Stark Professor of Christian Ethics at Yale University and a former president both of the
Society of Christian Ethics and of the Catholic Theological Society of America); Luke
Timothy Johnson, A Disembodied ‘Theology of the Body’: John Paul II on Love, Sex and
Pleasure, COMMONWEAL. Jan. 26, 2001, at 11 (Johnson, a laicized priest, is the Robert
W. Woodruff Professor of New Testament and Christian Origins at the Candler School
of Theology, Emory University); PATRICIA B EATTIE J UNG & R ALPH F. S MITH ,
HETEROSEXISM: AN ETHICAL CHALLENGE (1993) (Jung teaches theology at Loyola
University of Chicago; Smith, now deceased, was an ordained Lutheran pastor who
taught at Wartburg Theological Seminary, Dubuque, Iowa); KEVIN T. KELLY, NEW
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL ETHICS (1998) (Kelly, a Catholic priest in England with broad
pastoral experience, is a moral theologian); David McCarthy Matzko, Homosexuality and
the Practices of Marriage, 13 MODERN THEOLOGY 371 (1997) (McCarthy teaches theology
at Mount Saint Mary’s College, Emmitsburg, Maryland); Paul J. Weithman, Natural Law,
Morality, and Sexual Complementarity, in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY: ESSAYS ON
LAW AND NATURE 227 (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997)
(Weithman, a Catholic, teaches philosophy at the University of Notre Dame); DICK
WESTLEY, MORALITY AND ITS BEYOND 169–98 (1984) (Westley, a Catholic, teaches
philosophy at Loyola University of Chicago); Jon D. Fuller, The Catholic Church,
Homosexuality, and Cognitive Dissonance (2000) (unpublished manuscript, copy on file
with author) (Fuller, Associate Professor of Medicine at the Boston University School of
Medicine, is a Jesuit priest and a member of the adjunct faculty at the Weston Jesuit
School of Theology and at the Harvard Divinity School).
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concepts of procreative complementarity, then the love of two persons of the
same sex need be no less than that of two persons of the opposite sex. Nor need
their experience of ecstatic bodily communion be less valuable.9

Ruether’s position does not mean that with respect to sex, anything
goes. Consider what Margaret Farley, a Catholic sister and Stark
Professor of Christian Ethics at Yale University has written:
My answer [to the question of what norms should govern same-sex relations
and activities] has been: the norms of justice—the norms which govern all
human relationships and those which are particular to the intimacy of sexual
relations. Most generally, the norms are respect for persons through respect for
autonomy and rationality; respect for relationality through requirements of
mutuality, equality, commitment, and fruitfulness. More specifically one might
say things like: sex between two persons of the same sex (just as two persons of
the opposite sex) should not be used in a way that exploits, objectifies, or
dominates; homosexual (like heterosexual) rape, violence, or any harmful use of
power against unwilling victims (or those incapacitated by reason of age, etc.) is
never justified; freedom, integrity, privacy are values to be affirmed in every
homosexual (as heterosexual) relationship; all in all, individuals are not to be
harmed, and the common good is to be promoted.10

9. Rosemary Ruether, The Personalization of Sexuality, in FROM MACHISMO TO
MUTUALITY: ESSAYS ON SEXISM AND WOMAN-MAN LIBERATION 70, 83 (Eugene C.
Bianchi & Rosemary Ruether eds., 1976) (emphasis added). Cf. Edward Collins Vacek,
The Meaning of Marriage: Of Two Minds, COMMONWEAL, Oct. 24, 2003, at 17, 18
(“When, after Vatican II, Catholics began to connect sexual activity more strongly with
expressing love than with making babies, it became harder to see how homosexual acts
are completely different from heterosexual acts.”).
10. Farley, supra note 8, at 105. Farley adds, “The Christian community will want
and need to add those norms of faithfulness, of forgiveness, of patience and hope, which
are essential to any relationships between persons within the Church.” Farley, supra
note 8, at 105. Cf. Vacek, supra note 9, at 19 (“There are many other functions that
current marriages fill: interpersonal commitment, permanence, sexual exclusivity,
economic rights. Prima facie, these benefits seem to be as good for homosexual persons
as they are for heterosexual persons, and thus they seem to warrant equivalent public
recognition.”).
In “Preserve, Promote, Protect Marriage,” the Administrative Committee of the U.S.
Conference of Catholic Bishops, in support of its “[strong opposition to] any legislative
and judicial attempts, both at state and federal levels, to grant same-sex unions the
equivalent status and rights of marriage—by naming them marriage, civil unions or by
other means,” gives a (nonreligious) reason that does not presuppose the Church’s
official teaching on sex and procreation. Pope, supra note 8, at 537. Such reason is that,
in the long run, extending the benefit of law to same-sex unions would have subversive
consequences for marriage as we have known it.
The magisterium fears that a purely non-procreative, contractualized notion
of marriage might lead to the elimination of the family and to anarchy in
child-rearing practices. They believe that even conservative gays who want
to have the monogamous commitments receive the social support that comes
from legal validation are, unwittingly or not, pursuing a Trojan horse policy in
which entry into the institution will eventually lead to its demise. Instead of
helping matters, contractualism would leave them on their own and make it
easier for fathers routinely to abandon their children.
Pope, supra note 8, at 559 (citing Robin Fretwell Wilson, Children at Risk: The Sexual
Exploitation of Female Children After Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 251). Cf. Geoffrey
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Nunberg, Wed the People? (In Order to Form a More Perfect Gay Union), N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 2004, § 4, at 7 (“For opponents [of recognizing same-sex unions as marriages],
broadening the definition of marriage is like opening an exclusive hotel to package tours,
with the result that the traditional clientele will no longer feel like checking in.”).
Although this is the principal argument advanced in public political debate by activists
opposed to the legal recognition of same-sex unions, there is scant (if any) empirical data
to support it. For a careful presentation and vigorous rebuttal of the argument, one
should read William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al., Nordic Bliss? Scandinavian Registered
Partnerships and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, in 2004 ISSUES IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP: SINGLE-SEX MARRIAGE art. 4, http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss5/art4.
In the 1990s, the opponents of same-sex marriage created a new line of
argument critique . . . . The new line, which has been embraced within the
White House and the most anti-gay circles of Capitol Hill, is this: “We love
gays and lesbians—but as a society we cannot give them things that would
undermine traditional marriage, which is the foundation of America’s values
and culture. Same-sex marriage would do precisely that—undermine marriage
and the nuclear family. For that reason, neutral people should be skeptical of
complete equality for these people. . . . We traditionalists love just about
everyone—and look what we’ve done for homosexuals, we don’t put them in
jail anymore. But a positive and loving approach requires that we consider the
public welfare, especially the welfare of children, our most vulnerable charges.
So we cannot go along with the entire ‘homosexual agenda,’ for it sacrifices a
great institution and the public welfare.”
Id. at 1–2.
Significantly, some Catholic bishops in the United States have recently expressed a
willingness to consider supporting, as a matter of distributive justice, the extension of
some of the benefits of law to same-sex unions. See Editorial, Bishop Brings Reason to
Issue of Gay Benefits, NAT’L CATHOLIC REP., Nov. 7, 2003, at 24:
[Daniel P. Reilly, Roman Catholic bishop of Worcester, Massachusetts,]
told legislators that the Massachusetts Catholic Conference, made up of the
dioceses of Boston, Worcester, Springfield and Fall River, was unequivocally
opposed to legislation that would recognize gay “marriage” or “civil unions.”
But the church is open, he said, to discussing what public benefits should
accrue to those in non-traditional living arrangements.
. . . “If the goal is to look at individual benefits and determine who should be
eligible beyond spouses, then we will join the discussion,” said Reilly.
. . . [Reilly] engaged the issue on the church’s terms, saying such benefits are
a matter of “distributive justice.”
...
“Some argue that it is unfair to offer only married couples certain
socioeconomic benefits,” Reilly told [a committee of Massachusetts legislators].
“That is a different question from the meaning of marriage itself.”
“The civil union bill before this committee confuses the two issues,
changing the meaning of spouse in order to give global access to all marital
benefits to same-sex partners in a civil union. This alters the institution of
marriage by expanding whom the law considers to be spouses. Let’s not mix
the two issues.”
Id.
Even more recently, the papal nuncio to Spain, Archbishop Manuel Monteiro de
Castro, “has surprised public opinion by defending legal same-sex unions as a ‘right.’”
Julius Purcell, Nuncio Backs ‘Right’ to Gay Unions, THE TABLET, May 15, 2004, at 30.
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Of course, the fact that the gender-complementarity claim is controversial
is not to say that one should reject the claim. I am not assuming here
that the claim is false. I mean only to suggest how problematic it would
be to amend the U.S. Constitution on the basis of such a controversial
claim. Why tie the hands of each and every state legislature—not just
today, but tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow, and the day after
that—in the way the proposed FMA would do? Why should we presume
that our moral insight into the question of gender complementarity and
marriage is so secure and immune to revision that we should be willing
to tie the hands of our children, and of our children’s children, and so on,
with respect to the issue?11 Is that an appropriate, prudent, or judicious
use of the constitutional amendment process?

The nuncio’s words took commentators by surprise, as the Spanish bishops
officially hold the view that homosexual relationships cannot receive any kind
of approval. . . .
“It is right that other types of relationship are recognized,” the nuncio said.
He added that those in such unions should have the same rights to social
security “as any other citizen.” But “let’s leave the term ‘marriage’ for that to
which it has always referred,” he added.
Id. See also Results on Gay Marriage, Stem Cell Research, AMERICA, Nov. 15, 2004, at
5:
Bishop George H. Niederauer of Salt Lake City did not endorse the
proposed constitutional amendment in Utah, saying that he believed that state
law already prohibited same-sex marriages. He said he shared concerns voiced
by all three candidates for attorney general about the amendment’s stipulation
that “no other domestic union may be recognized as a marriage given the same
or substantially equal legal effect.”
Cf. Brian Lavery, Ireland: Premier Backs Rights for Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2004, at A6 (“Prime Minister Bertie Ahern said his government might consider giving
same-sex couples more rights, which would allow them to benefit from cheaper tax rates
and more favorable inheritance laws.”); Jennifer 8. Lee, Congressman Says Bush Spoke
About Options on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2004, at A15 (“President Bush
believes states can use contract law to ensure some of the rights that gay partners are
seeking through marriage or civil union, a South Carolina congressman said Sunday.”).
11. Cf. John Mahoney, THE MAKING OF MORAL THEOLOGY: A STUDY OF THE
ROMAN CATHOLIC TRADITION.
At any stage in history all that is available to the Church is its continual
meditation on the Word of God in the light of contemporary experience and of
the knowledge and insights into reality which it possesses at the time. To be
faithful to that set of circumstances . . . is the charge and the challenge which
Christ has given to his Church. But if there is a historical shift, through
improvement in scholarship or knowledge, or through an entry of society into a
significantly different age, then what that same fidelity requires of the Church
is that it respond to the historical shift, such that it might be not only mistaken
but also unfaithful in declining to do so.
Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
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*****
If you, like Christopher Wolfe, are morally opposed to granting
marital status to same-sex couples, then you have good reason to oppose
a legislative effort to grant such status to same-sex couples. Moreover,
you also have good reason to support an amendment that would prevent
judges from interpreting the U.S. Constitution to require states to grant
such status to same-sex couples.
However, I suggest that even if you are morally opposed to granting
marital status to same-sex couples, you nonetheless have good reason not
to support the effort to amend the U.S. Constitution. Put another way, you
have good reason not to support the effort to amend the Constitution to
prevent our children, and their children, from deciding for themselves,
when they are adults, through the ordinary political process, whether to
grant marital status to same-sex couples. You have good reason not to
insist that our children, or their children, do much more than change the
law on the books, which a legislative majority can do (if it can overcome
the normal burden of legislative inertia), if they reject the current
generation’s moral opposition to granting marital status to same-sex
couples. Under the proposed FMA, future generations would be forced to
surmount an extremely high hurdle: they must succeed in re-amending the
U.S. Constitution. This task, recall, is governed by
supermajority requirements both in Congress and in the states: an amendment
must be proposed, either by 2/3 of each House of Congress or by a convention
called at the request of the legislatures of 2/3 of the states, and then the
proposed amendment must be approved by the legislatures of or conventions in
3/4 of the states. This makes the U.S. Constitution one of the most deeply
entrenched [in the world].12

I cannot discern why we should want to burden our children, or their
children, with that effort—even if we are morally opposed to granting
marital status to same-sex couples.13
12. VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
414 (1999).
13. After I had drafted this comment on Wolfe’s paper, the following article, which
contends against the FMA, was published: Ronald James Krotoszynski & E. Gary Spitko,
Navigating Dangerous Constitutional Straits: A Prolegomenon on the Federal Marriage
Amendment and the Disenfranchisement of Sexual Minorities, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming
Summer 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=661244.
Wolfe complains about the growth of judicial power in the United States, a growth
that, he says, is “illegitimate.” Wolfe, supra note 2, at 896. The issue is much more
complicated than Wolfe’s comments suggest. In the period since the end of the Second
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World War, there has been a significant growth of judicial power not just in the United
States, but in many liberal democracies around the world. This growth has been
nourished principally by a desire to protect human rights laws more vigorously than,
many fear, they would otherwise be protected. Now, one may want to argue—as even
some liberal political and legal theorists such as Jeremy Waldron have done—that, all
things considered, this development is a bad thing and, to the extent possible, should be
reversed. But, again, the issue is much more complicated than Wolfe’s comments
suggest. Does Wolfe oppose the growth of judicial power in, say, Canada, under the
1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms (which is part of the Canadian Constitution)? In
South Africa, under the 1996 South African Constitution? In the United Kingdom, under
the Human Rights Act of 1998 (which entered into force in 2000)? In Europe, under the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms?
And so on. For my own take on the issue, see Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human
Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635
(2003).
Second, Wolfe complains about “the judicial expansion of sexual autonomy.” Wolfe,
supra note 2, at 899. This too, says Wolfe, is “illegitimate.” Id. at 896. In elaborating
his complaint, Wolfe proceeds as if it is not important to distinguish between Roe v.
Wade and its progeny on the one side and a case like Lawrence v. Texas on the other.
However, it is important to distinguish the two. There is good reason for concluding that
Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided—indeed, that Roe is a paradigm of (what Wolfe has
elsewhere called) “judicial imperialism”—while at the same time concluding that Lawrence
v. Texas was rightly decided. See Christopher Wolfe, The Rehnquist Court and
“Conservative Judicial Activism,” in THAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
AND THE CONSTITUTION 199, 199 (Christopher Wolfe ed., 2004) (“I want to take us this
charge of conservative judicial activism and, for the most part, agree with it, though for
reasons quite different from many other critics.”). In fact, several liberal constitutional
scholars have made this very argument, including John Ely, Gerald Gunther, and Ruth
Ginsburg, and, albeit belatedly, myself. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT 151–68 (1999) (analyzing liberal
arguments to Roe v. Wade). In any event, this issue too is much more complicated than
Wolfe’s comments suggest.
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